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The Political Theology of Fichte’s Staatslehre: Immanence and Transcendence 
 
Fichte’s so-called Staatslehre (doctrine or theory of the state)1 from 1813 contains much in the 
way of religious language. Terms such as ‘God’ and ‘revelation’ (Offenbarung) are used 
throughout the text and religious attitudes, views and doctrines are central to parts of Fichte’s 
account of history. The prevalence of religious concepts and the central role accorded to 
religion in what can be regarded as a form of political history make it tempting to apply the 
term ‘political theology’ to Fichte’s Staatslehre. The precise sense in which it is a political 
theology is far from clear, however, if one accepts the independence of its main political ideas. 
Fichte is said to employ traditional religious concepts in accordance with certain wider aims, 
and in so doing he divests these concepts of obsolete mythical elements and images. The term 
‘theocracy’ is singled out, because for Fichte it signifies the rule of reason and a form of 
legislation that has freedom as its object, while the heavenly realm (Himmelreich) of which he 
speaks is not an otherworldly realm of God but a spatio-temporal world that, through human 
thought and activity, is the site of human progress in the form of increasing freedom and 
rationality (cf. Zöller 2013, 99-100).  
According to this type of interpretation of Fichte’s Staatslehre, this doctrine or theory 
of the state cannot be classed as a political theology if one accepts that ‘authority, revelation, 
and obedience are the decisive determinations of the substance of political theology’ (Meier 
2006, 23). Here we have a political theology in the clear sense of the idea of a political order 
whose fundamental basis is provided by religious teachings which are held to have a divine 
source that is valid independently of any political order. A political order must instead conform 
to these teachings. Fichte explicitly rejects the claim that a genuine legal and political order 
ought to be based on the authority and obedience associated with religious faith. Rather, such 
an order ought to conform to requirements that derive from human freedom and rationality. 
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This leads him to accord to revelation only a limited, provisional role which amounts to its 
relegation to a hypothetical, pre-historical phenomenon which philosophical reflection is 
forced to posit once it encounters limits to its own powers of explanation.  
Even if Fichte’s Staatslehre cannot be viewed as a political theology in the sense that 
it concerns a political order based on religious teachings that are held to have a divine source 
and to be valid independently of this political order, it could nevertheless be a political theology 
in a different sense. Fichte’s employment of religious concepts and language in connection 
with the political and historical reflections set out in his Staatslehre might, for instance, be 
understood in terms of certain analogies and metaphors that have an illustrative function. At 
the same time, the process of divesting religious concepts of their mystical shell promises to 
bring to light their implicitly rational, secular content. There is, however, a third possibility that 
cannot be reduced either to a political theology in the sense of the idea of a political order based 
on authoritative religious teachings that are believed to have a divine source or to a 
thoroughgoing secularization of religious concepts.  
One of the most influential proponents of the idea of political theology, Carl Schmitt, 
claims that ‘[a]ll significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized 
theological concepts’, and he provides an example of the secularization of a theological concept 
when he claims that ‘[t]he exception in jurisprudence is analogous to the miracle in theology’ 
(Schmitt 2005, 36). Although the talk of an analogy with the concept of the miracle - a concept 
that, as we shall see, makes an appearance in Fichte’s Staatslehre - is compatible with a 
secularization of religious concepts, a potentially deeper connection is suggested by Schmitt’s 
further claim that the religious category of immanence came increasingly to inform nineteenth-
century legal and political thought (Schmitt 2005, 49-50). One example of this phenomenon is 
the way in which the normal functioning of law within a legal system is held to require that all 
cases fall within the impersonal legal realm, or ought to be made to do so. Thus, one might say 
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that the religious category of immanence is a property of the legal sphere. Yet the act of 
determining when a state of emergency applies – an act which for Schmitt defines sovereignty 
and shows who or what is sovereign – must represent an exception within this picture of a 
purely immanent legal order, in that it comes from outside this order and suspends it. This 
would correspond to how a miracle performed by a supernatural being suspends the laws of 
nature that otherwise provide the framework within which all natural processes, including those 
governing human life, occur. Thus, in opposition to the view of the legal order and its processes 
as being strictly immanent, we encounter a moment of transcendence at the political level. It 
might be claimed, then, that in such cases a theological way of thinking is operative even within 
a tradition of legal and political thought that takes itself to be free of thinking of this kind. 
Despite Fichte’s repudiation of political theology in the sense of a political theory founded on 
faith in divine revelation and absolute obedience to the commands of God, I shall argue that 
his Staatslehre is a political theology in the sense that it is informed at a fundamental level by 
the concepts of immanence and transcendence. There is, moreover, no evidence of Fichte’s 
awareness of the extent to which these concepts are implicitly present in his Staatslehre, so that 
he cannot be said to have secularized them.  
Before demonstrating the presence of the concepts of immanence and transcendence in 
Fichte’s Staatslehre, I shall first say something more about how Fichte repudiates traditional 
Christian theology, despite his use of concepts and language derived from it, before going on 
to look at some of the central problems which he seeks to address in the lectures which make 
up his Staatslehre. This will allow me to show that Fichte’s account of history can largely be 
understood in terms of the concept of immanence, and that there are, nevertheless, places in 
which Fichte himself introduces a moment of transcendence. Finally, I shall show that there 
are other places in the Staatslehre in which a moment of transcendence is present and threatens 
to destroy the immanence of Fichte’s account of history in a way that he himself does not 
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acknowledge. Fichte’s Staatslehre can for this reason be viewed as an especially interesting 
case of political theology. It is not a political theology in any straightforward sense, since it 
deliberately seeks to free religious concepts of their theological origins and meaning. Nor, 
however, is it a political theology in the weak sense that it employs religious concepts in such 
a way that their genuine content is reduced to a purely secular one. Rather, Fichte’s 
appropriation of religious concepts turns out to be incomplete because at a deeper level the 
Staatslehre operates with such concepts in an unreflective way and thereby introduces a 
religious content that does not fully escape its theological origins.  
 
Immanence 
Although Fichte states that God reveals himself, he claims that this revelation occurs in the 
form of knowledge (Erkenntniß), and not immediately so in an intuition (Anschauung) of God. 
More precisely, God reveals himself in the act of understanding the knowledge that one has 
(GA II/16: 24).2 This implies the existence of both a first-order and a second-order form of 
knowledge. In the first case, one knows that p, and in the second case one also knows how one 
knows that p. The second-order form of knowledge consists specifically in knowledge of the 
highest, in the sense of most general, law that determines that p is necessarily the case and 
thereby explains why it is the case, thereby providing the ‘ground’ of p. Thus, a new form of 
knowledge is generated: knowledge of the highest, most fundamental laws that govern all 
human mental activity and knowledge. This higher-order knowledge also includes knowledge 
of the law that ought to govern human action. Such higher-order knowledge is achieved only 
in the philosophical science that Fichte terms Wissenschaftslehre and in its various sub-
disciplines, which include the doctrine of right (Rechtslehre) and the doctrine of ethics 
(Sittenlehre). In the Wissenschaftslehre, therefore, one observes not only the fact that one 
possesses knowledge but also how this knowledge arises from its ground with the aim of 
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comprehending the law governing it (GA II/16: 25). This philosophical insight (Einsicht) must 
be assumed to be independent of the law which it observes, for otherwise there would be no 
way of understanding the philosopher’s ability to make this same law into an object that it 
observes and reflects upon.  
Fichte identifies the revelation of God with this act of philosophical insight and thereby 
reduces God to the object of the knowledge of such insight, as opposed to identifying God with 
a transcendent being that reveals itself in such an act but at the same time exists independently 
of it. This is not to say that the type of law that the Wissenschaftslehre discovers, or its 
theological expression ‘God’, lacks objectivity altogether, in the sense that it is reduced to the 
act of philosophical insight through which it is known and in the absence of which it would not 
exist at all. Rather, this act of insight discovers and comprehends a law that is already present 
in human reason as such. Nevertheless, as a law of mental activity in general, or as a law of 
moral agency in particular, the law is not independent of the activity or agency that it 
determines. All the act of philosophical insight adds, therefore, is reflective knowledge of the 
fact that this law is indeed always present in such activity and agency and how it is so. Already, 
then, Fichte’s use of a religious concept – in this case, the concept of God – suggests the notion 
of immanence as opposed to that of transcendence.  
Fichte characterizes the direct object of philosophical insight as the image (Bild) of a 
law which determines, and thereby forms or shapes, our experience of being (Sein). This object 
is not, therefore, the law itself, which, as noted above, is not identical with the act of 
philosophical insight by means of which it is known. He speaks of the law in so far as it forms 
the direct object of philosophical reflection as the ‘first’ or ‘primary’ image (das erste Bild) 
that explains - and in this sense presents itself in - the particular laws governing nature, laws 
which are thereby reduced to ‘depictions [Abbildungen] of the law – the visibleness of this 
same law’ (GA II/16: 21). In the Staatslehre, Fichte is concerned with knowledge – and thus 
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with the image - of a particular law and its application in so far as a legal and political order is 
a condition of this law’s appearance. The law in question is a moral or ethical law (sittliches 
Gesetz) which Fichte describes as the ‘image of something supersensible, purely spiritual, thus 
something that does not exist but that only ought to come to exist through the absolute initiator 
[Anfänger] of being, the will’ (GA II/16: 29). This knowledge has to do, then, with insight into 
something that ought to be, and which must, therefore, enter a process of becoming in 
accordance with the law whose image forms the direct object of the insight in question. Here 
we can already see why Fichte’s Staatslehre is primarily concerned with history and, in 
particular, with the emergence of a state governed by law, whose members are all held to be 
equal.  
A law-governed state and right (Recht) more generally are conditions of the moral law’s 
appearance in the world – if not of its existence qua law – in the sense that they provide the 
‘external’ conditions of moral or ethical freedom (sittliche Freiheit). They do so by 
guaranteeing to each and every individual the type of freedom that consists in being able to 
will independently of the choices of others, that is, in accordance with ends that one has set 
oneself (GA II/16: 31-32). The state also plays an essential role in relation to moral freedom 
by helping to secure for each and every individual the material conditions of moral agency. 
Thus, even if self-preservation and personal safety are ‘external’ ends in relation to moral 
freedom, in the sense of being mere means to a higher end (that is, moral agency and the 
realization of the moral law), the satisfaction of the needs connected with them is no less 
necessary with respect to the appearance of the moral law than is the act of guaranteeing the 
negative conditions of moral agency (cf. GA II/13: 214). 
From what has been said so far, there appear to be no grounds for identifying the God 
of Fichte’s Staatslehre with the one found in traditional Christian theology. God is instead 
identified with the object of philosophical insight into the grounds of all intelligible human 
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mental activity and agency, that is to say, the fundamental and most general laws governing 
such activity and agency. For this reason, the revelation of God is identified with the ‘image’ 
in which these laws appear to the subject or to the agent that comprehends them. These laws 
do not, however, exist independently of the mental activity and agency that they govern; rather, 
all philosophical insight achieves is reflective awareness of the existence of these laws in all 
such activity, and how they govern or ought to govern it together with knowledge of the 
essential nature of these laws. Fichte does not, therefore, have in mind the idea of a transcendent 
God in such statements as the following one: ‘Only God exists. Apart from him there is only 
appearance [Erscheinung]’ (GA II/16: 63). In the case of the moral law, moreover, God must 
first enter a process of becoming in order to appear (or to express the idea in religious language: 
to reveal himself) at all. This process of becoming is identified with the course of human history 
up to Fichte’s own time and beyond it. God’s revelation must, therefore, be viewed as 
incomplete until the historical process in question has been completed. From a Christian 
perspective this idea is arguably problematic, in that the Incarnation is thereby reduced to a 
partial revelation of God that must be supplemented by a secular historical process. The coming 
of Christ is, in fact, reduced by Fichte to part of the same historical process.  
In addition to these considerations, the role of the moral law and moral freedom in 
Fichte’s Staatslehre forecloses the possibility of treating this text as a political theology in the 
sense of a political theory founded not only on faith in divine revelation but also on obedience 
to the commands of God. By its very nature moral freedom demands that it is the will of the 
individual moral agent that initiates an action. This will must therefore be undetermined by the 
will of another individual or by any other external cause. This moral freedom is incompatible 
with reliance on an external authority and blind obedience to the commands of God precisely 
because they would amount to an external cause. Genuine moral freedom instead requires 
insight into the law in accordance with which one acts, and this insight can be attained only by 
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means of a freely undertaken mental act. Thus, moral freedom requires the kind of insight that 
Fichte identifies with the revelation of God. There is, moreover, another necessary condition 
of moral freedom, in that one must also actually will to act in accordance with such insight. 
The moral law and the moral agent are, therefore, logically independent of each other. This 
logical distinction between the moral law itself and the moral agent that wills it entails that a 
moral agent, even when it attains moral insight and acts in accordance with it, does not and 
cannot become God. The divine will is nevertheless identical with its expression in the moral 
law, if not with its expression in the will of individual moral agents, which is something 
secondary. Consequently, there is once again no reason to assume the existence of a 
transcendent God. Rather, God is held to be identical with a law that is constitutive of rational 
moral agency as such. 
Fichte speaks of certain ancient societies in a way that very much fits the picture of a 
political theology, because the state and the constitution are said to be viewed as a divinely 
arranged political order whose authority together with that of its representatives are not to be 
questioned. Although Fichte here refers to belief or faith in authority (Autoritätsglaube) (GA 
II/16: 113), this state of affairs is, in accordance with the demands of moral freedom, to be 
replaced in the course of history by a legal and political order that is compatible with, and 
serves as a condition of, this same freedom. This requires, among other things, granting 
everyone the same legal and political rights (GA II/16: 119-120). Fichte associates this 
universal demand for equality and freedom with the coming of Christ (cf. GA II/16: 132). Yet 
he identifies the actual emergence of this same demand with an emotional and practical need. 
He does not, therefore, speak of a revelation where we might most have expected him to do so. 
Thus, even here Fichte does not introduce an element of transcendence in the form of divine 
intervention in the course of history, that is to say, an act or event which can only be fully 
explained in supernatural terms. He claims instead that, 
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Thus around the beginning of Roman world-domination [Weltherrschaft] a terror of sin 
and unholiness had spread everywhere, and a fearful striving to be taken up into the 
consciousness, the protection and love of the Godhead … This thirst should now be 
satisfied in a completely different way, just as it has prepared the way for the success 
of this means of satisfying it: a thirst that manifested itself in history in this way only 
twice; at that time, and at the time of the Reformation, and will one day come again for 
a third time in another form. (GA II/16: 130) 
 
Fichte’s introduction of the idea of a necessary historical process driven by certain fundamental 
human needs, in which moral freedom together with its legal and political conditions become 
increasingly manifest nevertheless invites the following question: Does he really manage to 
explain the emergence of a legal and political order that is compatible with moral freedom and 
is able to serve as a condition of it in a way that remains internal to this historical process? If 
Fichte is able to do this, the notion of immanence would inform his account of history in such 
a way as to prevent the need to introduce the transcendence associated with a supernatural 
event that interrupts the course of history.  
Fichte appears to be opposed to theories of history that can be thought to contain a 
moment of transcendence because they conceive of God as a being that intervenes from outside, 
as it were, in the course of history so as to realize certain ends; a being which must be thought 
to exist independently of the historical process that it determines. He criticizes organic theories 
of history for the way in which they view the history of the human race as akin to the life of a 
plant, which develops out of a single seed to bloom in the shape of a divine realm of wisdom 
and virtue, but then explain away evil by means of an appeal to God’s purposes and to divine 
providence. Despite the way in which the metaphor of the life of a plant lends itself to the idea 
10 
 
 
of an immanent process, this view of history is incompatible with the concept of God as a God 
of freedom because God would not want to provide us with a good that we desire whose very 
nature requires that we freely attain it ourselves without any outside intervention, and could 
not do so in any case (GA II/16: 52). This organic theory of history is fundamentally mistaken 
in another respect, for it not only introduces God in order to explain away any apparent 
anomalies, and thereby reduces the extent to which history can be regarded as the work of 
moral freedom alone, but also leaves no room for this freedom by treating history as a quasi-
natural process.  
It may look, then, as if Fichte wants to reject completely the idea of a transcendent God 
that intervenes in human history and thereby introduces a causal factor that in conjunction with 
other such factors is designed to produce a certain effect. Rather, human beings alone must 
determine the course of human history by means of actions that are not themselves causally 
determined.3 In this regard, the emergence of a legal and political order that is compatible with 
moral freedom and serves as a condition of it must be shown to be internal to a historical 
process in which human beings alone are the actors. Fichte’s account of history and the idea of 
God found in his Staatslehre thereby reflect a commitment (albeit an implicit one) to the 
concept of immanence. In the next section, we shall see that Fichte is nevertheless forced to 
introduce a moment of transcendence, as is signalled by his own use of the term ‘revelation’.4 
 
 Transcendence  
In the course of his lectures Fichte sets out certain antinomies – he himself speaks of a ‘logical 
circle’ (GA II/16: 69). In each case there is a proposition (or thesis) for which a proof can be 
offered, and a counter-proposition (or antithesis) that states the opposite but is nevertheless as 
equally well grounded as the original proposition. Fichte removes these antinomies by means 
of a third proposition which allegedly combines them. One such antimony concerns the relation 
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between the concept of freedom and the concept of coercion, both of which are central to 
Fichte’s theory of right and must, therefore, be reconciled if the possibility of the establishment 
of a rational legal and political order is to be demonstrated. On the one hand, moral freedom 
demands that everyone be free and able to act in accordance with his or her insight. On the 
other hand, given that the concept and the existence of right are predicated on the idea that 
individuals, in virtue of their freedom, may fail to act in ways that respect the freedom of others, 
and that they may therefore need to be forced to respect it, the concept of right equally entails 
the legitimacy of coercion (Zwang) and the existence of the power (Gewalt) necessary to 
enforce right.  
The opposition between these two equally well-grounded propositions can be resolved 
only by means of the idea of a power that acts to realize the concept of right in a way that is 
compatible with the rational insight of each and every individual, and for this reason cannot be 
held to violate an individual’s moral freedom even when it coerces him or her. In short, there 
must be a coercive power that, when necessary, forces individuals to act (or not to act as the 
case may be) in a way they would have acted (or not have acted) if they had possessed sufficient 
rational insight and had acted (or not have acted) in accordance with this insight. This is, in 
effect, a version of Rousseau’s claim that individuals can be ‘forced to be free’ (Rousseau 1997, 
53), in the sense that they are coerced into acting in conformity with the conditions of their 
own freedom. In this particular case, the conditions in question concern the existence of a legal 
and political order in which the freedom of each and every individual is not only guaranteed, 
but also limited so as to guarantee the freedom of all. This introduces a further difficulty, 
however, because the attempt must be made to lead individuals to the standpoint at which they 
are able to achieve the relevant form of insight, allowing coercion to be replaced by genuine 
moral freedom, and, for Fichte, the possibility of succeeding in this undertaking must therefore 
be assumed.  
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On these grounds, Fichte claims that in addition to a coercive institution 
(Zwangsanstalt) there must be another institution whose task is to lead everyone to the point at 
which they possess insight into the rightfulness (Rechtsmäßgkeit) of coercion (GA II/16: 67). 
Fichte identifies this second institution with the Zwingherr. I shall leave this word untranslated: 
it combines the verb to force, coerce or constrain (zwingen) with the word for ‘master’ or ‘lord’ 
(Herr). Although the term ‘Zwingherr’ in this way implies domination based on force, we shall 
see that it is misleading in so far as it suggests the existence of an oppressor or tyrant. In aiming 
to lead all individuals to the standpoint at which they gain sufficient insight into the conditions 
under which coercion can be legitimately exercised, the institution of the Zwingherr in fact 
aims at its own abolition.5 Nevertheless, for the time being at least, the Zwingherr will need to 
force any individuals who are unwilling to undergo the education that would lead them to adopt 
this standpoint to undergo it, and in fulfilling the task of educator (Erzieher) the Zwingherr will 
have to act as a figure of authority and power, whose intention is to generate in everyone insight 
into the fact that what they have until now be forced to do was the right thing to do (GA II/16: 
67). This role of educator requires possession of the relevant type of insight on the part of the 
Zwingherr. Yet how can the Zwingherr know that he possesses such insight? Fichte’s answer 
to this question is simply that ‘the Zwingherr must be able to presuppose that his insight is 
infallible, and about this he is accountable to his conscience’ (GA II/16: 67). The fact that 
someone possesses such insight must, however, be regarded as rather miraculous, given that 
others are assumed to lack it. Thus, the introduction of the institution of the Zwingherr already 
begins to strain the immanence of Fichte’s account of history. It is not in connection with the 
Zwingherr, however, that Fichte himself introduces a moment of transcendence in the form of 
revelation. 
Even if Fichte’s introduction of the Zwingherr is assumed to remove the relevant 
antimony or logical circle, it is only able to do so at the price of introducing either an infinite 
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regress or another antinomy. The Zwingherr must be assumed to possess the relevant form of 
insight. This presupposes, however, the existence of an earlier Zwingherr who educated a later 
one with regard to the nature of a social and political order that is compatible with the concepts 
of right and moral freedom. Yet this earlier Zwingherr must in turn have been educated by an 
earlier Zwingherr. The only option, it seems, is to assume the existence of a human being who 
possesses the required insight. What is more, the Zwingherr must also be assumed to possess 
a moral will, for otherwise his motive for educating others in such a way that they attain the 
standpoint of moral freedom that he himself has already attained would remain a mystery. This 
is especially the case when the universal attainment of this standpoint would mean, in effect, 
the abolition of the institution of the Zwingherr itself, since to aim at such a thing requires a 
selfless disposition on the part of the Zwingherr.  
Fichte is thereby led to speak of a ‘beginning of the ethical world’ which ‘posits a will 
that qualitatively, in its own intuiting, is moral, without having made itself so through its own 
freedom – through its mere existence, through its birth’ (GA II/16: 87). This will possesses a 
quasi-natural character, in that it is immediately determined by the moral law and could only 
act in accordance with this law. It would, in short, be reduced to the means of realizing moral 
ends that it had not itself freely willed. This points to the concept of a divine understanding in 
which the will of the individual and the end to which the individual’s actions serve as the means 
are synthetically combined. This concept corresponds to the idea of providence (Vorsehung) 
and expresses a miracle (Wunder). In relation to the idea of providence, Fichte even speaks of 
a ‘divine world plan aimed at the moral education [Bildung] of the human race’ (GA II/16: 88).  
This appeal to the idea of providence generates another antinomy, however. On the one 
hand, we have the proposition that there can be no such divine governance of the world. This 
is because the possession of a moral will must itself be the work of the individual whose will 
it is, given that moral freedom demands that individuals freely will something, including their 
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own moral dispositions. The possession of a moral will and moral freedom cannot, therefore, 
be brute facts about oneself in the same way as physical features and personality traits are. On 
the other hand, there is the proposition that there must be such governance, because only in this 
way can the existence of freedom – or ‘the visibleness of freedom’ (die Sichtbarkeit der 
Freiheit) (GA II/16: 89) as Fichte himself puts it – be explained. The solution to this antinomy 
is, Fichte claims, to be found in the idea that something which is initially merely given may 
nevertheless subsequently be produced in accordance with a clear concept, and in this way 
serves in its givenness only as the prefiguration (Vorbild) of something that is to be brought 
about through the exercise of freedom. In other words, a model is provided, but it is a matter 
of human freedom whether or not individuals subsequently adopt this model as the object of 
their willing. If this model were universally adopted, a type of historical circle would arise, for 
history would return to its starting point at the same time as the story of how humanity recreated 
an initially given moral order through its own free actions would introduce an important 
qualitative difference, so that it would not be a case of returning to the very same beginning. 
Fichte goes on to claim that this starting point could only be that of a ‘original humanity that 
in terms of its quality is moral; whose mere existence brings with it that which in the appearance 
that proceeds from it is developed with freedom’ (GA II/16: 91). In other words, we must begin 
with the idea of a race that was miraculously moral in a natural sense and was thereby able to 
provide a model for future races whose members, or at least some of them, freely adopted it. 
Fichte is led, then, to introduce another original race; one that is this time ‘without revelation, 
a free one’ (GA II/16: 103), whereas the first original race appears through a revelation that 
occurs in time.  This ‘first miracle’ is now past, however, and with the new race ‘the 
development of freedom has entered its natural course’ (GA II/16: 93).  
The introduction of the concept of revelation and the concept of a miracle marks a clear 
concession to transcendence, in that something external to the historical process that forms the 
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object of history in the Staatslehre is introduced to explain the possibility of this same process. 
This moment of transcendence relates, however, only to human pre-history, and it is only a 
hypothesis, albeit a necessary one, that is introduced to explain the appearance of freedom in 
the course of history. The course of history itself, by contrast, remains a matter of immanence 
in the sense identified earlier. I shall now argue with reference to Fichte’s account of the 
Zwingherr that a further moment of transcendence appears and does so in such a way that even 
the course of history itself turns out not to be a purely immanent one. This further moment of 
transcendence is the result of certain difficulties that arise in connection with the idea of a 
Zwingherr and Fichte’s judgement of a dominant political figure of his own age, namely 
Napoleon.  
 
The Zwingherr and History 
The immanence of Fichte’s account of history requires avoiding any further moments of 
transcendence in the form of some miracle or other intervention in the normal workings of 
history that points to an act performed by a supernatural entity with the intention of producing 
a certain effect. His immanent conception of history favours a linear model of history 
characterized by a continuous, progressive line of development which concerns the increasing 
presence or ‘appearance’ of the moral law and moral freedom in the world, despite ant opposing 
tendencies exhibited by nature or humanity. A causal nexus that produces historical events, and 
in which acts of human freedom play a causal role, is here held to be sufficient to produce 
effects that are compatible with the idea of moral and intellectual progress. As we have seen, 
the Zwingherr plays an essential role in bringing about the increasing presence or ‘appearance’ 
of the moral law and moral freedom. I shall now argue that the person of the Zwingherr and 
the causal contribution that his actions make to the course of human history threaten to 
introduce another moment of transcendence into Fichte’s account of history that implies the 
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existence of a quasi-religious element in his Staatslehre which proves to be resistant to 
philosophical reflection and explanation.  
Fichte spends part of the lectures that make up his Staatslehre attempting to answer the 
practical question of how someone can be recognized as the type of individual with the qualities 
demanded of the Zwingherr. As we have seen, the possession of a moral will and moral insight 
are the most essential of these qualities. I shall return to Fichte’s attempt to deal with this issue 
in the Staatslehre, but first I shall turn to his Rechtslehre of 1812, which is based on another 
series of lectures that Fichte did not himself prepare for publication. This Rechtslehre provides 
a more detailed account of the principles governing the legal and political order that is to be 
produced in the course of history and forms an essential condition of the appearance of moral 
freedom in the world. Thus, given that the Staatslehre is interested in history only in so far as 
it concerns the genesis of a legal and political order that is compatible with, and serves as a 
condition of, moral freedom, the Rechtslehre complements the Staatslehre by providing an 
account of the nature of this legal and political order. Moreover, at one point in his Rechtslehre, 
Fichte concerns himself with the specific question of how political authority and power can be 
combined with a moral will and moral insight, as needs to happen in the case of the Zwingherr 
in his role as an educator of humankind, a role which may require forcing others to undergone 
an education that will eventually elevate them to the standpoint of moral insight and freedom 
that he himself already occupies. Not surprisingly, therefore, the Rechtslehre and the 
Staatslehre end up being confronted with what appears to be an identical problem. 
In the section on the constitution in his Rechtslehre from 1812 (GA II/13: 279-286), 
Fichte views the dangers of transferring power from the people to a single person or group of 
people in terms of the problem that the person or people invested with political authority could 
be mistaken about the demands of absolute justice or may fail to subordinate their private wills 
to that which they nevertheless recognize the idea of justice demands. In other words, the ruler 
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or rulers could lack either moral insight or a moral will, or both of these things at the same 
time. Fichte identifies two general solutions to this problem. The first solution is that 
sovereignty should be invested only in the person whose own private will happens to be 
identical with, or most closely approximates to, a truly just one. Fichte expresses this solution 
in terms of the demand that the best person ought to rule. Given his formulation of the problem 
of political authority in his Rechtslehre from 1812, by the best person Fichte must be taken to 
mean the person who has insight into what justice demands and possesses a moral will which 
ensures that this insight is not ignored or misrepresented for the sake of private interests. 
Already, then, we can see how the ruler will need to possess the same qualities that the 
Zwingherr must possess. The second solution is that the private will of the person who happens 
to rule becomes truly just or as close as possible thereto.  
Fichte mentions various problems in relation to both solutions. These problems include 
the infinite regress generated by the idea that the will of the ruler, like the will of every private 
person, must be subject to a law of coercion, so as to ensure that it itself wills in accordance 
with the demands of justice, for this demand presupposes the existence of another will capable 
of applying the law of coercion. Yet what guarantee is there that this second will’s intentions 
and actions will always be in accordance with the demands of justice, apart from the existence 
of another will capable of applying the law of coercion and so on ad infinitum? This leads 
Fichte to argue that we must simply accept the existence of a sovereign will that coerces others 
but is not itself coerced; an assumption that simply confirms the need for a ruler who already 
possesses moral insight and a moral will. Thus, as in the Staatslehre’s positing of an original 
moral people, Fichte is driven to accept the existence of a moral will which itself lacks moral 
freedom, in that its moral nature is something merely given, as opposed to being something 
that is itself freely chosen, as it must be if it is to be the work of moral freedom. This time, 
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however, it is not a matter of a hypothetical race existing in a pre-historical age, but, rather, a 
matter of the type of person who is qualified to govern a modern state.  
In response to the suggestion that the rulers could be given an excellent education 
(Erziehung), Fichte recognizes that the following question then arises: Who would educate the 
educator himself along with those individuals who are to choose an educator on behalf of the 
future ruler? Once again, an infinite regress arises. Fichte also claims that even if the existing 
rulers were to recognize one’s individual’s superiority, they would not give up their power to 
this individual, and the masses would not elect such an individual because only the good can 
recognize others of their kind, while even among an assembly of the best people it may happen 
that each of them would want to be ruler, trusting himself more than others. This particular 
problem relates directly to a key idea that Fichte introduces in order to explain how someone 
can be recognized to possess the qualities required of a Zwingherr.  
In the Staatslehre Fichte claims that the appointment of the sovereign (Herrscher) must 
be decided by an estate of teachers (Lehrstand), for only the members of this estate would be 
qualified to judge whether or not someone has shown himself through his deeds to possesses 
the greatest understanding among his peers (GA II/16: 78). In addition to the problem 
concerning whether one can in fact rely on the members of this estate to make the right choice, 
we once again encounter an infinite regress similar in kind to the one generated by the 
Zwingherr’s role of educator. The very existence of a learned estate with the ability to judge 
this matter correctly presupposes that the members of this estate have themselves been educated 
to the standpoint of moral insight and moral freedom, and this in turn presupposes the existence 
of an educator who must in turn have been educated. Fichte recognizes this problem, and in the 
Staatslehre he even speaks of it in terms of an act on the part of a supernatural being: ‘We are 
directed to an estate that does not posit itself, but is in fact a product of God’s grace’ (GA II/16: 
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76). In the face of such difficulties as the ones outlined above, Fichte is forced to conclude in 
the Rechtslehre that 
 
the task of constructing right, which has now been led back to the task of making the 
most just person of his age and nation into the ruler of the same, cannot be solved by 
means of human freedom. It is therefore a task for the divine governance of the world. 
Justice in the state depends, however, on the resolution of this task; this is therefore also 
a task for the divine governance of the world. (GA II/13: 285)  
 
The matter is, in short, to be decided by the course of history, which is itself held to be 
determined by some kind of divine plan and is not, therefore, the product of the free actions of 
human moral agents who execute this plan. Fichte assumes, then, that history will bring about 
the advance of moral insight and thus the possibility of moral freedom, and we can here see 
how he attempts to cling to the notion of immanence by entrusting a certain outcome to a linear 
historical process which unfolds without any outside intervention. At the same time, however, 
Fichte views this process itself, and thus the outcome in question, as being determined by some 
kind of divine plan.  
Although Fichte’s talk of ‘divine governance’ may be intended in a purely figurative 
sense, it suggests the existence of a transcendent being that determines the course of history in 
accordance with certain intentions that it has. This is because the notion of a plan implies the 
existence of an intelligent being which first devised it. Although one might respond that this 
intelligent being could be immanent to history in the sense of being identical with the rational 
plan which unfolds in the course of history, the problem then arises as to how the realization 
of this plan is to be guaranteed, if there is not some kind of transcendent being that may 
intervene in the course of history with the aim of ensuring that history develops in accordance 
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with such a plan. Otherwise one would simply have to trust the historical process itself to 
produce the required rational outcome, namely, a legal and political order compatible with the 
concept of right and moral freedom, which in term requires the possession of moral insight and 
moral freedom on the part of the Zwingherr. Yet this would sit uncomfortably with Fichte’s 
talk of ‘divine governance of the world’, which implies that the task of ensuring that history 
takes the right course is part of an ongoing process. Thus a causal factor that is external to the 
historical process determined by it is introduced, and the immanence at which Fichte's account 
of history aims is thereby broken. Unlike the case of the original people, however, where the 
moment of transcendence is found at the very beginning of human history, this moment of 
transcendence is more far-reaching, in that it concerns a rational plan that must determine 
history whenever the normal causal series of historical events produces outcomes that threaten 
the realization of the rational plan in accordance with which the world is to be governed. The 
problems that lead Fichte to introduce this moment of transcendence taken in conjunction with 
his own account of certain recent historical developments suggest, in fact, that some form of 
quasi-divine intervention in the course of human history will be needed just as much in the case 
of the modern state as at the beginning of history.   
As Fichte’s account of the role of the Zwingherr and the idea of a divine governance of 
the world show, something more than the happy coincidence of a moral will and moral insight 
in a single person is required to establish a legal and political order that is compatible with the 
concept of right and moral freedom. Rather, a moral will and moral insight must be 
accompanied by possession of the power to force others to obey one’s will, and the emergence 
of such a state of affairs cannot be left to chance. Without this power the Zwingherr would only 
be able to influence those individuals who are already willing to undergo the form of education 
for which he is responsible. This power is, in short, needed to force those unwilling to undergo 
this form of education to undergo it and to become in time morally free. The Zwingherr would 
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not, in fact, be a Zwingherr if he possessed a moral will and moral insight but lacked the power 
to enforce his will. Yet how likely is it that a moral will and moral insight will be combined 
with political power as the means of enforcing obedience in the same historical person? The 
prospect of their being combined as a result of the chance coming together of various causal 
factors, including conscious human actions, in the course of history are arguably slim, 
especially when the fulfilment of the task entrusted to the Zwingherr will require a long period 
of time, as is surely the case with an educational process that aims to raise the human race, and 
not just isolated individuals, to the standpoint of moral insight and moral freedom. Fichte 
himself witnessed a phenomenon which, by his own account, shows that it is just as likely, if 
not more so, that history when left to itself will produce individuals who possess the necessary 
power but completely lack a moral will and moral insight. The phenomenon in question is 
Napoleon, about whom Fichte has the following to say: 
 
Those people who want to speak as badly of him as possible always point only to the 
bloody corpse of the Prince d‘Enghien, as if this was the pinnacle of his deeds. I mean 
another one, however, in relation to which the murder of Enghien pales in comparison 
almost to nothing … The French nation was struggling to attain the realm of freedom 
and right … As this self-knowledge began to dawn, the supreme direction of affairs – I 
shall remain silent about through which means – fell to this man … If there had been 
any affinity with this concept [of freedom] in his way of thinking … he would not have 
given up this end, but instead sought the means to it. The fact would not have remained 
hidden from him that a regular education of the French nation towards the standpoint 
of freedom lasting perhaps for several generations is this means … What he instead did, 
how he cunningly and slyly cheated the nation of its freedom, need not be set out here. 
(GA II/16: 61-62)6    
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What is of particular relevance in this passage is the way in which Fichte explains Napoleon’s 
betrayal of the ideals of the French Revolution in terms of his lack of any personal identification 
with the concept of freedom, and that this lack of personal identification with the concept of 
freedom explains why Napoleon was incapable of comprehending, let alone implementing, the 
means of realizing these ideals, namely, an education that would raise the nation to the 
standpoint of moral freedom. This education must take place over a long period of time, and it 
thus assumes that the necessary moral insight will be transmitted directly from generation to 
generation. There will, in short, have to be a succession of Zwingherren. Clearly, however, 
Napoleon lacks the essential qualities required of a Zwingherr, which are a moral will and 
moral insight, while possessing in abundance something that the Zwingherr must also possess, 
if only as a means of fulfilling the task with which he has been entrusted, namely, political 
authority and the coercive means of enforcing his will. Therefore, Napoleon must be held either 
to break the series of Zwingherren that had already been established and is necessary to 
establish ‘the realm of freedom and right’ or to be incapable of forming the first member of 
such a series. In either case, the immanence of the process of historical development in 
accordance with the idea of a divine governance of the world would be broken, and the need 
would accordingly arise for some kind of external intervention in the historical process to 
remedy this defect.  
If history is as likely to produce a figure such as Napoleon, in whom political authority 
and power are detached from a moral will and moral insight, as it is likely to produce an 
individual in whom all these attributes are combined, and if such figures tend to have 
considerable influence on the further course of history, as was arguably the case with Napoleon, 
the historical appearance of a Zwingherr or series of Zwingherren capable of fulfilling the task 
assigned to this institution in Fichte’s Staatslehre looks far from certain. One might even be 
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tempted to say that it is so unlikely that only an act of divine intervention could secure the 
appearance of this Zwingherr and the continuation of this institution until the establishment of 
a realm of right and freedom. History could then no longer be understood in terms of the idea 
of immanence but would instead require a moment of transcendence. The appearance of the 
Zwingherr would then rival the Incarnation, though this time it would not be a case of the 
miraculous coming together of the divine and the human, but the coming together of a moral 
will and moral insight with political authority and power. The moment of transcendence here 
is admittedly weaker, since in the Incarnation that which is divine and eternal miraculously 
becomes human and finite, despite the fact that the first set of terms and the second set of terms 
are mutually exclusive.7 Although this time there is no logical contradiction, and the coming 
together of a moral will and moral insight with political authority and the power to enforce 
one’s will in a single person in the course of human history is therefore conceivable, the 
Zwingherr can be thought to have something in common with the historical Christ if Fichte’s 
characterization of Napoleon is anything to go by, in that the coming together of these attributes 
in a single person begins to appear miraculous. 
I have shown that Fichte’s Staatslehre can be understood in terms of the religious 
concepts of immanence and transcendence, even though Fichte himself does not explicitly 
invoke these categories, and despite his intention to employ religious concepts in a secularized 
way. Fichte’s conception of history in particular can be explained in terms of the concept of 
immanence. Yet his attempt to offer a purely immanent account of historical development is 
only partially successful even by his own account, since he is forced to introduce a moment of 
transcendence at the very beginning of history. I have argued, moreover, that there are grounds 
for claiming that an element of transcendence is also present in Fichte’s account of the history 
of the modern state, given what is required of the Zwingherr on whom the emergence of a legal 
and political order compatible with the moral freedom of all individuals depends and his 
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characterization of Napoleon. It might here be said that it is not surprising that the Staatslehre, 
contrary to Fichte’s intentions, should represent a political theology in the robust sense that 
religious concepts inform it in a way that does allow their reduction to a purely metaphorical 
or illustrative status when the Christian world view of his own time and society informs his 
lectures. Thus, despite the way in which his use of religious concepts can at one level be 
explained in non-theological, purely philosophical terms, at a deeper level Fichte cannot help 
letting such concepts determine his account of the modern state and its history together with 
the philosophical standpoint from which this account derives. Yet there is no reason to think 
that religious concepts such as immanence and transcendence might not also underlie political 
theories which forsake such religious concepts altogether and regard their own secularity as 
self-evident. Indeed, Fichte’s Staatslehre represents a particularly interesting case in this 
connection, in that it self-consciously seeks to deprive religious concepts of their theological 
origins and meaning. On the one hand, this reflective use of religious concepts might be thought 
to promise a more thorough, if ultimately incomplete, attempt to avoid the unwitting 
introduction of a political theology through the uncritical employment of secularized versions 
of these concepts long after the political theology of the past has allegedly been consigned to 
the dustbin of history. On the other hand, the fact that Fichte’s attempt to transcend political 
theology turns out to be incomplete may make one more cautious about claiming that political 
theology is something that does indeed belong to the past. 
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1 This work was not prepared for publication by Fichte himself.  Rather, the text was prepared for posthumous 
publication on the basis of the notes for a series of lectures he gave at the University of Berlin shortly before 
Fichte’s unexpected death in the same year. The full title given to the published version of the lectures was Die 
Staatslehre, oder über das Verhältniss des Urstaates zum Vernunftreiche (The Theory of the State, or concerning 
the Relation between the Original State and the Realm of Reason). This title is not one that Fichte himself gave 
to his lectures. 
2 In what follows the critical edition of Fichte’s works (Fichte 1962-2012) will be cited as GA according to series 
(Roman numeral), volume (Arabic numeral) and page number. 
3 It has been argued that the Staatslehre is based on a religious view of world history that excludes the possibility 
of a failure of history to achieve its final end, and that in this respect it differs from the view of history found in 
the earlier Addresses to the German Nation (Reden an die deutsche Nation) which speaks of only the possibility 
of achieving this final end. Cf. Metz 1990, 129-130. This invites the question, however, as to how this historical 
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necessity can be reconciled with the moral freedom that is a central concern of the Staatslehre. On the one hand, 
historical necessity threatens moral freedom, in that human actions are then ultimately determined by the end 
towards which history tends. On the other hand, moral freedom threatens historical necessity, in that it introduces 
an element of contingency.  
4 Fichte’s interest in this concept extends right back to his first (anonymously) published work, Attempt at a 
Critique of All Revelation (Versuch einer Kritik aller Offenbarung). See GA I/1; Fichte 2010.  
5 This idea relates to a theme that is already present in Fichte’s defence of the French Revolution published in 
1793 (cf. GA I/1: 253), namely, that by playing its part in bringing about the universal reign of the moral law 
among human beings, the state aims at his own abolition. For more on this theme, see James 2015, Chapter 5.  
6 Fichte had already written a critical piece on Napoleon entitled Concerning the Nameless One (In Beziehung auf 
den Namenlose) in 1806. See GA II/10: 83-85. 
7 This explains Kierkegaard’s association of the Incarnation with the absurdity of that which he calls the ‘absolute 
paradox’. Kierkegaard 1992, 217-218. Kierkegaard describes the Incarnation as ‘a break with all thinking’ 
(Kierkegaard 1992, 579), and he speaks of the ‘crucifixion of the understanding’ (Kierkegaard 1992, 564) in 
connection with it.  
